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2.1 Introduction
This paper develops a framework of approximate accounting identities
that is used to discuss the limitations of existing empirical models of
exchange rate determination. The poor explanatory power of the empir-
ical models of the seventies has now been well documented by Meese and
Rogoff (1983 and in this volume) and Backus (1981). In this paper the
limitations are first addressed by using the accounting framework to
demonstrate that some commonly adopted behavioral assumptions can-
not jointly explain a major portion of exchange rate movements. The
middle sections of the paper address some issues in modeling how news
leads to revisions in the expectational terms that enter the exchange rate
accounting framework. The final sections illustrate the issues by drawing
inferences and conjectures about the types of news that contributed to
the major swings in mark/dollar exchange rates (spot and forward)
during 1980-81. The paper stops short of using the accounting
framework as a building block for conducting regression tests of specific
behavioral assumptions about the expectational terms.
Most empirical models of exchange rate determination seem deficient
in "anchoring" the level of the expected path of the (real) exchange rate.
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The observed level of an exchange rate can be explained in terms of
expectations about the level of the exchange rate that will prevail at any
future date, but the exchange rate level expected at some future date
must be anchored independently to explain the general level of the
expected exchange rate path. This point is clear from interest rate parity
conditions under the assumption of risk neutrality, and the argument
extends to finite-horizon portfolio balance analysis under the assumption
of risk aversion, as emphasized by Dooley and Isard (1981).' One feature
of the accounting framework is to provide a building block for using the
notion of long-run goods market or balance of payments equilibrium to
construct a behavioral model that anchors expectations about the long-
run real exchange rate.
The accounting framework also describes the general (nonbehavioral)
form of the "rope" that links the observed spot and forward exchange
rates to the anchored but unobservable level of the expected long-run
real exchange rate. Under risk neutrality, the long-term real interest
differential is the link between the observed level of the (price-adjusted)
spot rate and the expected long-run real spot rate. Equivalently, the
expected long-term inflation differential is the link between the observed
level of the (price-adjusted) long-term forward rate and the expected
long-run real spot rate. For the risk averse case, a long-term exchange
risk premium is added to the rope. The general form of the accounting
framework can accommodate survey data, macromodel forecasts, auto-
regressive forecasts, or analytic structural models of inflation expecta-
tions. Similarly, it can accommodate either structural models or alterna-
tive representations of the risk premium. By characterizing the rope,
moreover, the accounting framework suggests that quantitative discus-
sions of exchange rate volatility can benefit from focusing on the length of
the rope. In particular, if it is expected to take T years for the real
exchange rate to converge to its long-run level, then the percentage
change in the spot exchange rate that should be associated with a ceteris
paribus shift in the term structure of nominal interest differentials (and
hence real interest differentials) is the percentage point change in the
compound T-year interest differential, or roughly T times the change in
the T-year interest differential as commonly measured in percentage
points per annum.
1. By contrast, Rodriguez (1980) develops a reduced-form exchange rate equation for a
rational expectations portfolio balance framework in which the coefficient on the exchange
rate currently expected to prevail at horizon T converges to zero as T approaches infinity.
The speed of convergence can be interpreted to depend inversely on the degree of substitut-
ability between assets denominated in domestic and foreign currencies, and the assumption
of imperfect substitutability or risk aversion is a necessary condition for the rational
expectations assumption to "eliminate" the expected future exchange rate from the model
by pushing the future to infinity (see Dooley and Isard 1982a).21 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
The accounting framework is developed in section 2.2 by manipulating
the covered interest rate parity condition and some definitional identities.
Attention is focused on one resulting form of the exchange rate equation
in which the observable long-term forward rate, deflated (or price-
adjusted) by the observable ratio of current domestic and foreign price
levels, is approximately identical (in logarithmic form) to the sum of
three unobservable terms: the expected long-run real exchange rate, the
expected long-term inflation differential, and the expected long-term
premium for bearing exchange risk. The framework emphasizes the
different channels through which news can lead to changes in observed
exchange rates (and /or interest rates and/or price levels) by generating
revisions in the unobservable expectations terms.
Section 2.3 applies the accounting framework, using a time series of
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)
inflation expectations (forecasts) for seven industrial countries, to con-
struct measures of the extent that observed changes in exchange rates
(between six foreign currencies and the U.S. dollar) can be "explained"
under the commonly adopted assumptions of time invariant expectations
about the long-term real exchange rate (or purchasing power parity level,
PPP) and the risk premium. Under these assumptions the substantial
observed variability of spot exchange rates can only be explained by
substantial variability in long-term real interest differentials. To the
extent that real interest differentials are expected to vanish beyond the
long-run horizon, this in turn suggests that exchange rate variability has
been associated with variability in the shape of the term structure of
nominal interest differentials (relative to the shape of the term structure
of expected inflation differentials), and that the traditional use of short-
term interest differentials in exchange rate equations may be a poor
substitute for a focus on long-term interest differentials.
Section 2.4 provides some empirical evidence on the length of the
horizon over which real interest differentials are expected to persist,
which is assumed to be roughly the same as the length of time that is
expected to elapse before the real exchange rate converges to its long-run
value. The evidence compares survey data on long-term inflation ex-
pectations, collected several times between early October 1980 and early
September 1981, with data on the two- to five-year and five- to ten-year
forward nominal interest rates that are implicit in the term structures of
yields on dollar- and mark-denominated Eurodeposits and Treasury
issues. The evidence supports the assumption that it is expected to take
longer than two years, but perhaps less than five years, for the real
exchange rate to converge to its long-run value.
Empirical work on exchange rate determination has made only limited
progress in modeling the news (see Dornbusch 1980; Frenkel 1981; Isard
1980; Longworth 1980), despite the strong presumption that changes in22 Peter Isard
exchange rates predominantly reflect revisions in expectations in re-
sponse to the news (see Mussa 1979). Sections 2.5-2.7 focus on some
issues in modeling expectations of the long-run real exchange rate, the
long-term inflation differential, and the premium for bearing exchange
risk. Sections 2.8 and 2.9 illustrate the issues by focusing on the major
swings in mark/dollar exchange rates (spot and five-year forward) during
1980-81 and by drawing inferences or conjectures about the extent to
which the swings were "explained" by revisions in each of the three
expectational terms. Section 2.10 summarizes the main points that
emerge from sections 2.5-2.9.
An appendix discusses how the accounting framework can be used as a
basis for forecasting.
2.2 An Accounting Framework
The framework developed in this section can be divided into two parts:
an anchor and a rope. The anchor is a theory about the expected long-run
real exchange rate based on notions of balance of payments equilibrium
and consistent with the conditional expectation of long-run purchasing
power parity (PPP). The rope that links observed exchange rates to the
expected long-run real exchange rate is provided by the interest rate
parity framework, as modified to allow for risk premiums.
The rope can be characterized by combining the covered interest rate
parity condition,
(1) s=f+RB-RA,
with definitions of the risk premium,
(2)
and the real exchange rate,
(3)
where s, /, and s
e denote the logarithms of the nominal values of the spot,
forward, and expected long-run spot rates, in units of currency A per unit
currency B; RA and RB denote nominal own rates of interest on assets
denominated in currencies A and B, as compounded over horizons that
extend until the long run is reached; pA andpB denote the logarithms of
the price levels in countries A and B; and a superscript e labels the
variable as an expectation. Together conditions (l)-(3) imply
(4) s = sreal
e + p
eA - p% - risk* + RB-RA.
It is convenient to express the expected future logarithmic price levels in
terms of expected rates of inflation (PA, P











Substitution then converts (4) into
(9) s = (pA -pB) + (r% - r
eA) + sreal
e - risk*.
Equivalently, when all observable variables are transposed to the left
side,




where the manipulation uses condition (1) and defines a price-adjusted
forward rate,
(11) fad)=f + PB-PA-
Condition (11) is analogous to condition (3). It is important to emphasize
that the nominal forward rate is adjusted by current price levels rather
than forward price levels; in a risk neutral world it would not be an
unbiased estimator of the expected future real exchange rate unless the
future relative price level was expected to equal the current relative price
level.
Much of the discussion below will focus on equation (9), but (10) is
more attractive for applying the model empirically since it imposes prior
coefficient values on observable price and nominal interest rate levels.
Models in which interest rates or money supplies are treated as "causing"
the exchange rate, rather than as jointly endogenous variables, have been
shown to involve specification bias by Glaessner (1979), Caves and Feige
(1980), and Meese and Rogoff (1983), among others.
Equations (9) and (10) apply to any horizon for expectations. In this
paper they are discussed in terms of a long-term horizon, based on the
view that the most plausible behavioral hypotheses for anchoring an
expected future exchange rate are hypotheses about the real exchange
rate that is consistent with long-run goods market or balance of payments
equilibrium. In empirical analysis based on condition (10),/adj is repre-
sented by a price-adjusted five-year forward rate after section 2.4 pre-
sents evidence suggesting that investors expect it to take longer than two
years for the real exchange rate to converge to its long-run equilibrium
value.24 Peter Isard
The right-side terms in condition (10) represent unobservable expecta-
tions. The spirit of condition (10) is that news about the factors on which
expectations are based leads to unobservable revisions in expectations
and observable changes in exchange rates (and/or interest rates and/or
price levels). The usefulness of condition (10) is for testing behavior
hypotheses about the expectational variables. Insofar as the expecta-
tional variables are unobservable, the behavioral tests must be implicit or
indirect, and, given that three expectational variables enter the exchange
rate equations, the tests are joint or simultaneous tests of three behav-
ioral hypotheses. This paper is oriented toward addressing the inadequa-
cies of commonly adopted behavioral hypotheses and stops short of
subjecting alternative hypotheses to regression tests.
2.3 The Inadequacy of Some Common Behavioral Assumptions
In principle, all of the expectational terms on the right side of condition
(10) should be treated as variables. Sections 2.5-2.7 will address the
issues of modeling the expectational terms. This section uses the account-
ing framework in conjunction with OECD inflation expectations (fore-
casts) to argue that under the common assumptions of time invariant
expectations about the long-run real exchange rate (PPP level) and the
risk premium, only a minor portion of observed changes in exchange
rates can be explained by focusing on the relationship between exchange
rates and short-term interest differentials—as is commonly done—with-
out explicitly taking account of changes in nominal interest differentials
that can be earned on investments beyond a twelve-month horizon.
2
The empirical exercise is to construct a time series of "residual"
changes in the spot exchange rate that cannot be "explained" by
observed changes in price levels or twelve-month nominal interest dif-
ferentials, or by revisions in the twelve-month OECD inflation forecasts.
The construction is based on a formula derived by first differencing
condition (9), assuming time invariant values of sreal
e and risk
6. Reflect-
ing the limited horizon of the OECD inflation forecasts, the real interest
differential is truncated beyond the twelve-month horizon. This leads to
(12) resid, = st-st-1 + (pA -pB\ - (pA -pB)t-\ + (RA - RB)t,t + 2 ~ (R-A - ^B)t-l,t+l
~ {PA ~~ PBYt,t+2 + (PA ~ PB)
et-\,t+\ •>
2. The tradition of focusing on the relationship between exchange rates and short-term
interest differentials partly reflects (and has contributed to) the fact that data on short-term
interest rates that are comparable across currencies are more readily available than data on
comparable long-term interest rates. The tradition also reflects an infatuation, prior to the
development of Eurocurrency markets, with examining the relative behavior of spot and
short-term forward exchange rates without providing a theory of the absolute level of either.25 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
where t runs through semiannual observations, corresponding to the
semiannual dates of the OECD forecasts. Given the assumptions under-
lying the derivation of condition (12), the proper interpretation is that
"resid" measures the sum of the changes in the expected long-run real
exchange rate, the expected return for bearing exchange risk, and the
real interest differential beyond a twelve-month (i.e., two-period) hori-
zon. The OECD forecasts are published for seven countries (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) and thus provide time series of "residual" changes in the ex-
change rates between the U.S. dollar and six other currencies.
Table 2.1 shows the observed, explained, and residual changes in the
logrithms of exchange rates, which correspond to percentage changes in
the levels of exchange rates. (The explained changes are computed last as
the differences between the observed and residual changes.) For thirty-
nine of the forty-eight entries the residual changes are larger than the
explained changes. As noted above, the residual changes can be viewed
as the error terms that arise from the joint assumptions that the expected
long-run real exchange rate and exchange risk premium are time in-
variant, and that real interest differentials are not expected to persist for
longer than twelve months. The residuals are generally too large to
attribute to differences between OECD inflation forecasts and "true"
measures of inflation expectations. Accordingly, the evidence suggests
that at least one of the following propositions must be true. Either (1)
expectations about the long-run real exchange rate (or PPP level) vary
widely over time, or (2) the exchange risk premium is large and variable,
or (3) substantial real interest differentials are frequently expected to
persist for longer than twelve months. Thus, to the extent that there is
some long-run horizon beyond which real interest differentials are ex-
pected to vanish, the assumptions of time invariant expectations of the
long-run real exchange rate and the risk premium would suggest that
exchange rate variability has been associated with variability in the shape
of the term structure of nominal interest differentials (relative to the term
structure of expected inflation differentials), which in turn suggests that
the traditional use of short-term interest differentials in exchange rate
analysis may be a poor substitute for a focus on long-term interest
differentials.
2.4 The Persistence of Real Interest Differentials:
How Distant Is the Long Run?
Condition (10) provides a useful analytic framework only to the extent
that the right-side expectational terms can be modeled, and among these
terms, the expected future real exchange rate cannot be easily modeled
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of a long-run steady state. For purposes of empirical analysis it is impor-
tant to focus on forward exchange rate observations for a maturity that
exceeds the expected length of the convergence interval over which the
real exchange rate moves to its long-run steady-state value (following an
isolated, ceteris paribus shock that disrupts an initial steady-state equilib-
rium) .
For many currencies, adequate historical data on forward exchange
rates against the U.S. dollar are not available for maturities longer than
one year. For a few currencies, including the mark, two-year and five-
year forward rates against the dollar are available (or can be constructed
from Eurocurrency deposit rates) on a daily basis. This section argues for
using the five-year forward rate in condition (10), based on evidence
suggesting that it is expected to take longer than two years, but perhaps
less than five years, for the real exchange rate to converge to its long-run
level.
The evidence is presented in table 2.2 The first two rows of table 2.2
present time series of survey data on the average annual rates of U.S.
inflation expected over the first and second halves of a ten-year horizon.
The two series are assumed to provide upper and lower bounds on the
U.S. inflation rates that were expected from the end of the second year
through the end of the fifth year. The expected two- to five-year U.S.
inflation rate declined from early October 1980 through early September
1981, and there is a strong presumption that any revisions in expected
long-term German inflation rates were upward,
3 thus implying an even
greater decline in the expected inflation differential. By contrast, there
were increases over the same period in the differentials between the
implicit two- to five-year nominal yields on dollar- and mark-de-
nominated assets, as shown for both Eurocurrency deposits and Treasury
issues.
4
Such evidence indicates that real interest differentials beyond a two-
year horizon were not time invariant, which rejects the assumption that
real interest differentials were expected to vanish within a two-year
horizon. Unless the substantial changes in two- to five-year real interest
differentials were offset by equal and opposite changes in the implicit
two- to five-year risk premium, the evidence also rejects the assumption
that the real exchange rate was expected to converge to its long-run level
within a two-year horizon.
3. Forecasts of German inflation, typically extending out over one-to-two-year hori-
zons, were generally revised upward as the mark depreciated against the dollar from
October 1980 through mid-August 1981.
4. The trends in the two- to five-year nominal interest differentials, computed for the
samples of daily Eurocurrency observations and the twelve observations of Treasury
differentials, pass the test of being significantly greater than zero with a high degree of
confidence.29 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News









































































































aIn percent per annum.
bBased on survey data on five- and ten-year U.S. inflation expectations collected about
once each quarter since mid-1980 by Richard B. Hoey, vice-president and chief economist
at Warburg Paribas/A. G. Becker, 55 Water Street, New York, N.Y. 10041. Data represent
simple averages of the expectations of several hundred institutional investment decision
makers.
The two- and five-year interest rates represent yields (paid once a year) on fixed-term
deposits, as collected daily by the Bank of America and made available through Data
Resources, Inc. The two-to-five-year rates represent implicit fixed-term yields computed in
the traditional manner.
dBased on averages within each month of market yields on U.S. and German Treasury
debts, by horizon to maturity, as published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the Monthly
Report of the Bundesbank (series 2, table 8c).
The bottom row of table 2.2 presents data on the differentials between
the implicit five- to ten-year nominal yields on U.S. and German Trea-
sury issues; data are not available on Eurocurrency yields for maturities
longer than five years. The data on Treasury differentials are constructed
from term structures of the average yields within each month. Together,
the data in the bottom row and the second row from the top might be
judged as a weak rejection of the hypothesis that real interest differen-
tials beyond a five-year horizon are time invariant, but the evidence does
not suggest substantial variation in the five- to ten-year real interest
differential.
To summarize, the evidence in table 2.2 argues against the assumption30 Peter Isard
that real interest differentials are expected to vanish within two years,
and thus argues against using a two-year (or shorter maturity) forward
rate in applying the accounting framework. Furthermore, the evidence is
not strongly critical of using a five-year forward rate, which is the only
alternative for which adequate data are available.
2.5 Some Difficulties in Modeling Inflation Expectations
With respect to modeling the expected inflation terms on the right side
of condition (10), the traditional use of long-term nominal interest rates
as proxy variables for long-term inflation expectations is inadequate,
since it implicitly denies any difference between the paths of nominal
interest rates and expected inflation rates over the horizon that is re-
quired to reach the long run. This point is underscored in section 2.9
below, where it is argued that the sharp appreciation of the dollar in the
first half of 1981 was associated with a downward revision in U.S. long-
term inflation expectations in response to fiscal policy news; yet long-
term dollar interest rates rose in the periods following the arrival of the
fiscal policy news.
The apparent responsiveness of inflation expectations to fiscal policy
news during 1981 also poses the challenge of modeling inflation expecta-
tions in a rational, forward-looking context that spells out the channels
through which budget deficits are assumed to influence inflation, whether
through the money-supply mechanism or the Phillips curve. As section
2.9 will emphasize, the data on prices, monetary aggregates, activity
indicators, and current budget deficits did not jump contemporaneously
with the fiscal policy news of 1981. Thus, to capture the revisions in
inflation expectations (without relying on survey data) requires not only a
forward-looking rational expectations model but also measures of ex-
pected future values of "explanatory" variables (in the inflation equa-
tion) that are not merely generated from autoregressions.
2.6 The Expected Long-Run Purchasing Power Parity Level
It seems unacceptable to model real exchange rates without relying on
some notion of goods market or balance of payments equilibrium. In a
world of two countries, each producing a different good, the domestic
price levels can be related to nominal money supplies, but an additional
balance of payments condition is required to explain the relative price
level or real exchange rate. In a Hechsher-Ohlin-Samuelson world in
which the two countries each produce the same two goods, the produc-
tion possibility frontiers and consumer indifference maps, which together
determine the domestic relative price levels for each country under
autarky, must be supplemented with a balance of trade condition (or31 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
perhaps a more broadly defined balance of payments condition) to deter-
mine the common relative price level that emerges under international
trade.
Many analytic models of exchange rate dynamics assume that the world
economy is expected to converge to a steady state in which the real
exchange rate is consistent with long-run balance of payments equilib-
rium; examples include Kouri (1976), Dornbusch (1976), and Calvo and
Rodriguez (1977). In principle, the existence of a long-run balance of
payments constraint, regardless of its particular form, implies that the
expected long-run value of the real exchange rate (if expectations are
formed rationally) will vary over time in response to any shocks that
generate revisions in expectations about the long-run values of other
variables that influence the balance of payments. Thus the expected
long-run PPP level should, in principle, be viewed as an endogenous
variable.
5
The empirical literature on exchange rate determination has taken only
limited steps to endogenize the expected long-run real exchange rate,
most notably those by Hooper and Morton (1982). The argument that the
long-run PPP level is in principle a variable, of course, leaves open the
question of whether it varies sufficiently to have a major influence on
observed exchange rates.
The major shifts in the relative price of oil during the 1970s provides
the strongest case for arguing that revisions in expectations about the
long-run PPP level may have been empirically important over the past
decade. The evidence seems clear (though not scientifically extracted
with formal techniques) that news which leads to small changes in the
outlook for the relative price of oil has a significant and predictable (ex
post) impact—in the hours or days during which the news is digested—on
the exchange values of the currencies of countries that are relatively well
endowed or relatively poorly endowed with energy resources. A major
difficulty that arises, however, in trying to identify such changes in
exchange rates with revisions in expectations about the long-run PPP
level is that the economic stabilization policies pursued by different
countries have responded differently to oil price shocks. In terms of the
accounting framework developed in section 2.2, empirical evidence that
month-to-month movements in exchange rates reflect significant re-
sponses to changes in the expected long-run PPP level must be extracted
from a joint test of behavioral specifications for the expected long-run
PPP level, the expected long-term inflation differential, and the expected
long-term return for bearing exchange risk. Identification is thus compli-
5. It is important to distinguish between conditional and time invariant expectations of
PPP, that is, between the relatively weak assumption that the expected PPP level can be
shocked by new information and the stronger assumption that the expected level of the
long-run real exchange rate is exogenously given.32 Peter Isard
cated by the fact that behavioral specifications for the latter two expecta-
tional factors cannot realistically be abstracted from the perceived or
expected responses of stabilization policies to the oil price shocks. In
particular, inflation expectations are sensitive to revisions in expectations
about monetary growth paths, and the risk premium may be sensitive to
revisions in expectations about fiscal budget deficits.
The difficulties of modeling expectations and quantifying the news can
hardly be avoided, however, in any serious attempt to resurrect faith in
structural exchange rate models. The starting point for modeling the
expected long-run real exchange rate is to specify the long-run balance of
payments constraint as a relationship between a constant steady-state
level of the real exchange rate and a list of other variables. In general, the
long-run values of these other variables are not known with certainty but,
presumably, can be described in terms of subjective probability distribu-
tions. Consistently, the balance of payments constraint can be viewed as
anchoring the long-run real exchange rate in terms of a probability
distribution that depends, under rationality assumptions, on the joint
probability distribution of the other variables. For purposes of estimating
an exchange rate model based on condition (10), the expected value of
the long-run real exchange rate must be characterized to replace sreal
e
with a testable behavioral hypothesis, and the variance of the long-run
real exchange rate is an important component of the risk premium, as will
be discussed in section 2.7.
Several contributions to the literature have addressed the notion that
unexpected shifts in (variables that influence) the current account lead to
revisions in expectations about the long-run real exchange rate (see
Dooley and Isard 1981; Hooper and Morton 1982; and Mussa 1980).
None of these contributions, however, has provided a satisfactory de-
scription of the balance of payments constraint. Dooley (1980) has
emphasized that the balance of payments is a concept of net debt flows
between geographical regions and no longer a good measure of net debt
flows denominated in any particular currency unit.
6 This implies that any
long-run constraint on the balance of payments owes its existence to the
political risk of default rather than to exchange rate risk. In a more recent
6. Many models of exchange rate dynamics assume that current account imbalances are
"financed" entirely by assets denominated in one particular currency, which essentially
amounts to assuming that residents of one of the two countries only hold assets denominated
in their home currency unit; an exception is Henderson and Rogoff (1982). The unrealistic
nature of the assumption is not problematic for models such as Mussa (1980) or Dornbusch
and Fischer (1980), in which risk neutrality is assumed and the role of wealth is directed
through its influence on the excess demand for goods. The assumption does raise problems,
however, for interpreting the class of empirical portfolio balance models represented by
Branson, Halttunen, and Masson (1977, 1979), Porter (1979), and Martin and Masson
(1979), in which measures of portfolio stock variables have been constructed by equating
net holdings of foreign currency denominated assets to cumulative current account imbal-
ances (in some cases adjusted for direct investment flows).33 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
paper, Dooley (1982) suggests that market mechanisms impose the long-
run balance of payments constraint via increases in political risk pre-
miums, and consequent exchange rate adjustments, which serve to pre-
vent cumulative current account deficits from ever reaching a level at
which debt service costs make default optimal for the debtor country.
The general nature of such a bound on cumulative balance of payments
flows does not impose a rigid constraint on the balance of payments
during any particular year in the long run, unless an assumption is made
that constrains all years to be similar once the long run is reached. The
latter assumption can be justified, however, not only on grounds of
analytic convenience but also by the argument that long-run foresight is
too imperfect to place any faith in predictions of how economic variables
will fluctuate around their long-run trends. In sum, the assumption of a
finite bound on cumulative balance of payments flows together with the
steady-state assumption of smooth growth of economic activity after the
long run is reached imply an expected balance of payments of zero over
any finite interval of the infinite long-run horizon.
7
With this justification, it is instructive to provide a simple characteriza-
tion of the steady state. In the two-country context, real output can be
imagined to grow at the same constant real rate of interest in each
country, with balance of trade. If one of the two countries holds net
claims on the other, the stock of these net claims also grows at the real
interest rate and thereby amounts to a reinvestment of net interest
income from abroad. Thus, net interest payments remain a constant
proportion of the output of the debtor country, so the incentive to default
never increases. Similarly, the wealth of the creditor country, as mea-
sured by portfolio size, increases over time in absolute size but remains
stationary relative to income, and real transfers never occur.
Such a framework can be described formally in terms of a balance of
payments condition:
(13) ANCF, = Xt- SREAL,Mt + r,NCF,;
an import demand function:
A:
(14) \og(Mt/Yt) = a0-a1rt- 2 a2,k jreal,_*; k = o
and an export function (or foreign import demand function):
(15) \og(Xt/Y*) = b0-birt+ f b2, k 0
7. It is not being assumed that balance of payments fluctuations are expected to never
occur, but rather that the ex ante subjective probability distribution of the balance of
payments (over any interval after the long run is reached) has a zero mean.34 Peter Isard
where M and X denote import and export volumes; Y and Y* denote
domestic and foreign incomes in real terms; NCF denotes net domestic
claims on foreigners in real terms; r denotes the domestic and foreign real
interest rates (which need not be distinguished for purposes of describing
the steady state); and SREAL denotes the level (as distinct from the
logarithm) of the real exchange rate. The steady state is characterized by
trade balance, by equal domestic and foreign real interest rates7, and by
constant growth at rate 7 of domestic and foreign output, of net claims on
foreigners, and hence of domestic and foreign incomes. Thus, conditions




where a2 = *ta2k, b2 = 2fr2, k->
 and Y/Y* is the constant steady-state ratio
of domestic and foreign incomes.
Condition (16) translates directly into a rational model of the expected
long-run real exchange rate that appears in the spot and forward rate
equations (9) and (10). The expected long-run real exchange rate de-
pends, loosely speaking, on expectations of the long-run ratio of domes-
tic-to-foreign activity levels, on perceived values of the exchange rate
elasticities of import and export volumes, and on expectations or percep-
tions about7, a0, b0, al5 and b±. Revisions insreal*, accordingly, can arise from revisions in expectations about the long-run values of Y/Y* or r, or
from revisions in perceptions about the values of the exchange rate
elasticities or the other parameters. It is worth repeating that while sreal
e
is the mean of a subjective probability distribution, the range of the
distribution may be wide and the variance high. The notion of long-run
balance of payments equilibrium need not anchor the long-run real
exchange rate at a point.
Condition (16) stops short of modeling how expectations about Y/Y*
and 7 and perceptions about the parameter values are formed and/or
revised. But together with the Marshall-Lerner condition (i.e., the
assumption that its denominator is positive) it provides a place for a
number of phenomena that are viewed as influencing exchange rates: (1)
An oil discovery in country A can be viewed—within the simple structure
of trade equations (14) and (15)—as raising the perceived long-run value
of b0 or lowering the perceived value of a0, thereby appreciating cur-
rency A. (2) A rise in the relative price of oil can be viewed as raising b0
for oil exporting countries and as raising a0 for oil importing countries,
with well-recognized effects on exchange rates. (3) Larger-than-expected
trade deficits (surpluses) in the short run that persist and do not merely
reflect unexpected changes in the explanatory variables that enter trade
equations can lead to revised perceptions of parameter values, to associ-35 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
ated revisions in expectations about the long-run real exchange rate, and
thereby to observed currency depreciation (appreciation). (4) Surprises
about the extent to which a country's trade balance is improving (de-
teriorating) following currency depreciation (appreciation) may lead to
upward revisions in perceptions of the elasticity parameters a2 and b2, to
an associated revision in expectations about the long-run real value of the
currency, and thereby to a change in observed exchange rates. (5) To the
extent that a surprisingly sharp domestic recession (boom) is viewed as
permanently lowering (raising) the level of domestic output relative to
foreign output, the domestic currency should appreciate (depreciate);
accordingly, activity shocks that are not expected to be completely offset
can generate a positive correlation between shifts in the trade balance
toward surplus (deficit) and currency appreciation (depreciation). (6) To
the extent that policy actions (e.g., tax measures or other "supply-side"
shocks) raise the domestic share of world markets at any given real
exchange rate, the a0 and b0 parameters will shift, with a0 — b0 declining and thereby generating an appreciation of the expected long-run real
value of domestic currency (i.e., a decline in sreal
e).
2.7 The Expected Premium for Bearing Exchange Risk
By its definition in condition (2), the expected long-term premium for
bearing exchange risk is the difference between the expected long-run
nominal spot rate and the observed long-term nominal forward rate. A
nonzero risk premium owes its existence to three factors: (i) a nonzero
probability, and hence some risk, that the future spot exchange rate may
differ from its expected level, (ii) private investors' aversion to that risk,
and (iii) a difference between the currency composition of public debts
that are forced (at market-clearing prices) into the portfolios of private
investors (as an aggregate) and the currency composition of the aggregate
portfolio that would minimize the risk assumed by private investors (see
Dornbusch 1982). Without any one of these factors the risk premium
would vanish.
Attempts to assess the empirical importance of the risk premium can
be classified into three approaches. Dooley and Shafer (1976), Hansen
and Hodrick (1980 and in this volume), Cumby and Obstfeld (1981), and
Meese and Singleton (1982), among others, have employed a variety of
methods to examine the time series properties of spot exchange rates and
forward exchange rates (or interest differentials); such studies have
generally concluded that the assumption of market efficiency implies that
the risk premium is significantly greater than zero, although not neces-
sarily very large. As a second approach, Dooley and Isard (1981) and
Frankel (1981, 1982) have tested the significance of simple structural
models of the ex ante risk premium in explaining the ex post change in the36 Peter Isard
exchange rate (over and above the forward premium); these studies have
found weak evidence of a small risk premium. As a third approach,
Krugman (1981) has derived a structural form for the risk premium and
inserted "reasonable" values of the structural parameters to calculate the
extent to which the risk premium might be judged to change in associa-
tion with given changes in asset stocks and wealth variables. Krugman
also finds no reason to believe that the risk premium is large.
The Krugman-type exercise is repeated here with "more reasonable"
parameter values. The purpose is to challenge Krugman's impression of
the order of magnitude of the risk premium and to suggest, in particular,
that changes in the risk premium may have accounted for a substantial
portion of the swings in the mark/dollar rate during 1981, which strongly
coincided (as documented in section 2.9 below) with shifts in the outlook
for U.S. budget deficits. Given the limited objective of being suggestive,
the formulation of the risk premium has been simplified in two important
ways: by ignoring differences in the portfolio preferences of U.S. and
foreign residents (i.e., wealth effects), and by assuming that both U.S.
and foreign residents optimize with respect to the dollar value of their
terminal wealths. Under these simplifications, the five-year risk premium
can be derived from a utility-maximizing framework as the product of the
coefficient of risk aversion (u), the perceived variance (v) of the ratio of
the five-year future spot rate to the current five-year forward rate, and the
share (Q) of dollar-denominated public debt in global private holdings of
dollar- and mark-denominated public debts (see Dornbusch 1982; Isard
1980; or Krugman 1981):
(17) risk
e = u • v • Q .
As the optimization problem is generally formulated, the asset-share
variable is a current, beginning-of-period concept. A more realistic for-
mulation for a rational expectations environment would provide an ex-
plicit role for expectations or subjective probability distributions about
the future paths of asset stocks and wealth variables. In the absence of
such a formulation, a third major simplification in what follows is to
interpret Q, heroically, as an end-of-period concept.
With this basis and interpretation of condition (17), a Krugman-type
calculation can be generated under the suggestions that u - 4, that v = VA,
and that Q changed by at least 2 percent during the early months of the
Reagan Administration. These numbers suggest that changes in the risk
premium "explained" at least a 2 percent appreciation of the dollar
against the mark during the first half of 1981. The value u = 4 is taken
from Grossman and Shiller (1981), who place it within the range of
estimates that have been published in the literature, and who argue as
well that a value of at least 4 is suggested by an empirical application of37 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
their model of stock price variability. The value v = VA reflects the
assumption that the subjective probability distribution of the five-year
future spot rate is normal, with a mean value of two marks per dollar
(roughly equal to the five-year forward rate), and with 67 percent of the
probability attached to the range between one and three marks per
dollar; hence the variance of the five-year future spot rate is 1, and the
variance of the ratio of the future spot rate to the forward rate is VA.
Finally, the alleged change of at least 2 percent in Q is based on the
perception that the fiscal policy proposals in the early months of the
Reagan Administration, and their acceptance by a surprising margin of
victory in a House of Representatives vote on May 7, reduced the
cumulative outlook for U.S. budget deficits over a five-year horizon by at
least $100 billion. Given an initial value of Q = .8, based on the initial
trillion dollar stock of U.S. public debt and the one-quarter trillion
dollar-equivalent stock of German public debt, a change of at least $100
billion, or 10 percent, in the expected stock of U.S. public debt suggests a
change of at least 2 percent in the expected ratio of U.S. to U.S. plus
German public debts.
To lend further support to the suggestion of substantial changes in the
risk premium, section 2.9 will present graphical evidence that movements
in mark/dollar exchange rates during 1981 coincided strongly with fiscal
policy news. As will also be detailed, survey data on long-term U.S.
inflation expectations suggest that revisions in inflation expectations can
only explain about half of the apparent responsiveness of the exchange
rate to fiscal policy news. Such arithmetic raises the possibility that the
five-year risk premium changed by as much as 5-10 percentage points
during the early part of 1981—even more than suggested by the calcula-
tions based on the oversimplified condition (17)—or by as much as 1-2
percentage points when measured in per annum units. On a priori
grounds, it does not seem implausible that rational investors may have
been so uncertain and risk averse to have required an additional expected
long-term yield of 1-2 percent per annum on their mark-denominated
portfolio holdings, given the rosy expectations created early in the
Reagan Administration.
8 Unfortunately, there seems to be no basis for a
refined judgment of whether the risk premium could have changed so
much without the analytical equipment of a forward-looking formulation
of the risk premium in terms of expected future asset stocks and wealth
variables, along with a better empirical assessment of parameter values
8. Dooley and Shafer (1976) have computed average profit rates, over and above
opportunity cost and transactions charges, that investors could have earned during recent
years by using filter rules to operate speculative positions in the foreign exchange markets.
These ex post measures lend support to the notion of risk premiums on the order of several
percentage points per annum.38 Peter Isard
and the extent to which expectations of future asset stocks and wealth
variables have shifted.
9
2.8 Explaining the Volatility of the Dollar during Spring 1980
This section and the next focus on the behavior of spot and forward
mark/dollar exchange rates during 1980-81, using the accounting
framework as a basis for drawing inferences and conjectures about the
response of these exchange rates to major elements of the news. In this
section the focus is on the extent to which the rise and fall of the dollar
during January-May 1980 can be "explained" by changes in the com-
pounded long-term real interest differential. The assessment involves a
straightforward analysis of how much of the swing can be "explained" by
changes in the compounded long-term nominal interest differential and
an informal analysis of whether the magnitude and timing of changes in
the residual can be plausibly attributed to revisions in expectations about
the long-term inflation differential. The obverse of this question is
whether it is plausible that the risk premium and the expected long-run
value of the real exchange rate remained constant throughout the period.
Figure 2.1 shows the behavior of the mark value of the dollar from
October 1979 through early December 1981, both on a spot basis and for
three-month and five-year forward maturities. It is interesting to note
that the correlation between the spot and five-year forward rate is high,
though not as near perfect as the correlation between the spot and
three-month forward rates.
Given the empirical evidence presented in section 2.4 and the fact that
five years is the longest maturity for which adequate data are available on
forward rates (or on differentials between interest rates on Eurodollar
and Euromark deposits), the analysis for the most part adopts the
assumption that the long run is expected to be reached within five years.
This essentially amounts to assuming that real interest differentials are
expected to vanish in less than five years—the equivalent (under risk
neutrality) of the assumption that the real exchange rate is expected to
converge to its long-run level in less than five years. Some consideration is
also given to the assumptions that the long run is expected to be reached
within one year or within two years (i.e., that real interest differentials
are not expected to persist beyond one or two years). The data represent
time series of Wednesday observations. An alternative focus on weekly
average observations conveys virtually the same impressions.
Figure 2.2 shows cumulative percentage changes since the beginning of
9. Dooley and Isard (19826) have estimated a rational expectations portfolio balance
model of the exchange rate which explicitly incorporates the influence of the expected
future paths of asset stocks and wealth variables on the risk premium, but which uses
autoregressive representations of the expected future stocks of assets and wealth.Wednesday data
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1980 in the spot rate and the five-year price-adjusted forward rate.
1
0
Based on condition (10), in the absence of revisions in expectations about
the long-run real exchange rate or changes in the risk premium, move-
ments in the five-year price-adjusted forward rate could be interpreted
entirely as revisions in expectations about the differential between Ger-
man and U.S. inflation rates over a five-year horizon.
To judge the maintained hypothesis that movements in the price-
adjusted forward rate can be interpreted as revisions in the expected
five-year inflation differential (measured per annum on the left scale in
figure 2.2 and per five years on the right scale), the data period is divided
into five subperiods. During January there was little movement in the two
exchange rates. Subperiod II in figure 2.2 began right after the U.S.
budget proposals and the Economic Report of the President were re-
leased on January 28 and 30, respectively. The subsequent three weeks
brought an upward revision in the expected pace of U.S. inflation: by
February 6 it had been discovered that the U.S. budget had substantially
underestimated the costs of military outlays for fuel; by February 13 new
data showed a strong acceleration in U.S. retail sales during January; by
February 20 it had been revealed that U.S. wholesale prices had jumped
1.6 percent during January, a sharp acceleration from December; and on
February 22 it was reported that U.S. consumer prices had also acceler-
ated sharply in January. Consistently, the dollar depreciated forward
over this subperiod, while downward pressures on the spot value of the
dollar were offset by a 1V2 percentage point increase in the Eurodollar
rate relative to the Euromark rate (per annum).
The news of the January rise in U.S. consumer prices ushered in
subperiod III in figure 2.2, as financial markets, according to Reuters,
reacted "perversely." The consumer price data strengthened expecta-
tions of further anti-inflationary policy measures by the U.S. author-
ities—expectations that were confirmed by the new budget proposals and
monetary and credit actions of March 14. Under the maintained hy-
pothesis, the path of the forward rate would imply that the expected U.S.
inflation rate, looking out over a five-year horizon, was revised down-
ward over the course of a month by roughly 2
xh percentage points per
10. The five-year forward rate is constructed from interest rates on fixed-term, five-year
Eurodollar and Euromark deposits, as collected by the Bank of America and made
available through Data Resources Inc. Similar interest rate data are available for five-year
Eurodeposits in Dutch guilders, Swiss francs, and French francs. The data have two notable
limitations. Markets are thin and on some days deposits are not transacted in each currency.
In addition, to the extent that the term structures of dollar and mark interest rates are not
flat, the data allow only an approximate construction of five-year forward rates, since
interest on the five-year deposits is paid at the end of each year. The price adjustment is
achieved by assuming that the change in relative price levels over the five-month period
occurred at a constant rate (i.e., the price-adjusted forward rate is the forward rate adjusted
for the trend in relative price levels, which was taken to be IVi percent at an annual rate
during the first half of 1980).41 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
annum relative to the expected German inflation rate. The revision in
inflation expectations was associated with an increase in real long-term
dollar interest rates relative to real long-term mark interest rates and led
to a strong appreciation of the spot dollar, even though nominal Euro-
mark rates moved up somewhat faster than Eurodollar rates.
Subperiod IV in figure 2.2 began on March 27 with the decision,
announced following the fortnightly meeting of the Bundesbank Central
Council, that German credit policies would be left unchanged. The
apparent upward revision in expectations about the pace of German
inflation, relative to U.S. inflation, was supported on April 2 by the
report of a full half-percentage point drop in the German unemployment
rate during March. Additional support may have been provided by major
new banking legislation, passed by the U.S. Congress on March 28, which
strengthened the Federal Reserve's control over money and credit
growth. During the first four trading days of April, spanning the long
Easter weekend, the spot and forward values of the dollar wavered
around levels 4 percent higher than where they had closed on March 26.
Then they dropped the full 4 percent on April 9. Included in the news that
may have led to the dollar's drop was the announcement late on April 8
that the German government had arranged to borrow one billion marks
from the U.S. government, the release of data on April 9 indicating no
change in German industrial production during February, and the predic-
tion by a respected U.S. banker that dollar interest rates would soon
begin to tumble. The first and second items suggested less pressure on the
German money supply, given the authorities' reluctance to push interest
rates higher, while the third item may have provided a revised impression
of how contractionary a stance the Federal Reserve had taken.
Subperiod V started on April 16, the day that U.S. prime rates began
the rapid descent from their peak. By the end of May, the five-year
Eurodollar rate had fallen by more than 4 percentage points per annum,
and by roughly 2V2 percentage points relative to the five-year Euromark
rate. Meanwhile the expected pace of U.S. inflation was revised down-
ward, particularly in response to the May 2 announcement that U.S.
unemployment had skyrocketed from 6.2 percent in March to 7.0 percent
in April. Consistently, the five-year forward dollar appreciated sharply in
response to the May 2 announcement.
The story provides reasonable explanations for the direction of swings
in spot and forward rates under the maintained hypothesis. Are the
magnitudes of the swings in the five-year forward rate also plausible
estimates of revisions in inflation expectations? It is plausible that the
inflation differential expected over a five-year horizon could have first
increased (during subperiod II) by about 1 percentage point per annum
and then declined (through the end of May) to roughly 3 percentage
points per annum less than what had been expected during January?42 Peter Isard
Changes of such magnitude in the relative U.S. and German inflation
outlooks were discussed by the financial press, although without explic-
itly looking much further into the future than the end of 1981. A convinc-
ing answer seems precluded by the absence of published inflation fore-
casts that extend as far as five years into the future and are revised
frequently enough to provide an interesting time series."
A major empirical point about the spring 1980 example is that changes
in real interest differentials, when compounded or integrated over a
long-term horizon, can potentially explain a substantial degree of ex-
change rate volatility.
1
2 The above analysis has focused on the revisions in
expected inflation differentials that are implied by the joint hypothesis
that spring 1980 was explained entirely by changes in real interest dif-
ferentials and that real interest differentials were not expected to persist
beyond a five-year horizon. For comparison, and despite the evidence to
the contrary presented in section 2.4, it is interesting to consider what the
joint hypothesis would imply if real interest differentials were only ex-
pected to persist for a year or two. Accordingly, in table 2.3 the third and
second columns from the right have been constructed to represent the
revisions in expected inflation differentials that are implied when the
joint hypothesis is modified by assuming that real interest differentials
were not expected to persist beyond horizons, alternatively, of one year
and two years. The joint hypothesis seems implausible under either of
these cases.
The issue of the horizon length over which real interest differentials are
expected to persist is an important question for assessing the extent to
which exchange rate volatility can be associated with changes in real
interest differentials. Section 2.4 has begun to address the question
empirically, but more extensive evidence and better tests are desirable, in
particular to explore the question of whether real interest differentials
beyond a five-year horizon are substantial. Economists who have been
inclined to think that real interest differentials are generally expected to
vanish within a year or two must confront the reality of five- to 10-year
real dollar interest rates, as traditionally defined, rising well above 7
percent per annum in the first eight months of 1981 when measured with
survey data on long-term inflation expectations. In the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of the high level of long-term real interest rates,
11. Two sets of survey data are available on long-term U.S. inflation expectations.
During each February, beginning in 1975, the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes has
sampled answers to the question: "About what percent per year do you think prices will be
(up/down) on the average during the next five to ten years?" Beginning in 1980 the question
has also been asked during August. A second set of data has been collected quarterly by
Richard Hoey beginning in mid-1980; see table 2.2, note b.
12. With the exception of Fellner (1979), few models of exchange rate determination
have focused explicitly on the arithmetic of compounding interest rates and expected
inflation rates over a long-term horizon.43 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
it is difficult to conceive of the mechanism that might have been expected
to eliminate real interest differentials within a one- or two-year horizon.
2.9 The Mark/Dollar Rate from June 1980 through December 1981
This section uses the accounting framework to discuss plausible ex-
planations for the major swings in the mark/dollar rate between June
1980 and early December 1981. Figure 2.3 illustrates that the swings in
the five-year forward rate were concentrated during six intervals: (i)
mid-June to early September 1980; (ii) early September to early Novem-
ber 1980; (iii) late January to mid-February 1981; (iv) late April to early
June 1981; (v) mid-August through Setember 1981; and (vi) the first half
of November 1981. Percentage changes in the five-year forward rate
during those intervals—roughly corresponding by construction to per-
centage changes in the spot rate after adjustment for associated changes
in the five-year nominal interest differential—can be associated either
with revisions in expectations about the ratio of German and U.S. five-
year inflation factors, or with revisions in expectations (explicit or im-




With respect to the 10 percent depreciation of the forward dollar
from mid-June through early September 1980, it seems clear in retrospect
that the major economic surprises during that period led to upward
revisions in expectations about U.S. inflation. Economists may never
agree on how to specify a structural model of inflation, but few structural
models would fail to find a role for either the unexpectedly sudden
bottoming out of the recession, the rapid rate of monetary growth, or the
dismantling of credit controls. Whether U.S. five-year inflation expecta-
tions increased by 2 percentage points per annum, thereby "explaining"
the entire depreciation, is subject to dispute. It does seem clear, how-
ever, that expectations about the duration of the recession began to be
revised no sooner than early June but certainly by early July, consistent
with the timing of the downturn in the forward rate. More specifically, the
announcements on May 30 of a 4.8 percent April decline in the leading
indicators, and on June 6 of a jump in May unemployment from 7.0 to 7.8
percent, suggested a continuing sharp downtrend in activity; while the
announcements on July 3 of a 7.7 percent June unemployment rate and
on July 10 of a 1.4 percent rise in June retail sales were reported (e.g., by
Business Week) to have taken almost all economic forecasters by sur-
prise. A final point that seems clear about this period is that news about
13. This statement ignores covariance in implicitly viewing the nominal forward rate as
the product of the expected ratio of price levels (or inflation factors), the expected real value
of the future spot rate, and a risk factor. The five-year forward rate is not adjusted for
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the strength of economic activity was not transmitted through only one
variable.
This last point may have useful implications for econometric modeling.
Information about both the timing and magnitude of activity surprises
can be increased by pooling a number of activity indicators rather than
relying on a single indicator that is only sampled once a month. This is
largely because every indicator of activity contains noise that market
participants must sift out by focusing on a cross section or sequence of
indicators, and partly because focusing on a cross section of indicators
increases the frequency with which new information can be received. The
same argument for pooling applies to econometric attempts to measure
unexpected shifts in price variables, etc.
The second major swing in the five-year forward rate—the 10 percent
appreciation between early September and early November 1980—can-
not be clearly attributed to major surprises about the state of the U.S. or
German economy. The U.S. economy showed mixed signs of strength
and weakness in early September and continued to show mixed signs in
early November. The key events during the period were the national
elections in both countries. Since the reelection of German Chancellor
Schmidt on October 5 was widely expected all along, the appealing
hypothesis is that the rise of the forward dollar during these two months
mainly reflected shifts in the perceived probability of a Reagan victory.47 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
Reagan was perceived as good for the dollar in the sense of being more
firmly committed than Carter both to reducing inflation (through fiscal
policy and support for tight monetary policy) and to stimulating U.S.
competitiveness (through tax incentives, removal of regulations, etc.). In
addition, the perception that Reagan was more committed to reducing
U.S. budget deficits may have had implications for the risk premium. At
the beginning of September, Reagan and Carter were fairly even in the
polls. As time passed, and particularly after the polls began to focus on
electoral votes, the probability that Carter could defeat Reagan appeared
to shrink fairly progressively.
1
4
It is an exaggeration to say that the five-year forward rate looks like a
step function during 1981, but it is striking that the major shifts in the
forward rate occurred during four brief intervals, suggesting that there
were four major doses of news that were transmitted and digested fairly
quickly. The first three major doses of news during 1981 concerned the
outlook for U.S. budget deficits. The news was conveyed, in particular,
by Reagan's January 29 press conference and February 5 television
address; by his April 28 speech to Congress and the surprising margin of
victory with which the budget proposals sailed through the House of
Representatives on May 7; and by large upward revisions in estimated
budget deficits that were officially announced in mid-August, followed by
mounting political opposition to further large budget cuts. The second
swing, from late April through early June, may also have reflected
spillover effects of the French elections on German economic prospects
as well as upward revisions in expectations about the size of future
German budget deficits. The beginning of the fourth swing, in early
November, coincided with announcements indicating a stronger-than-
expected recession in U.S. activity: in particular, with the announce-
ments on October 29 of a 2.7 percent September decline in the leading
indicators and on November 6 of a jump in unemployment to an 8.0
percent rate in October following a 7.5 percent rate in September.
1
5
Why should the dollar strengthen in response to a downward shift in
the expected path of U.S. budget deficits? One View is that a lower deficit
reduces the likelihood that the Federal Reserve will monetize debt in
excess of its money growth targets (or in excess of some prespecified
14. Even though Carter's predicted shares of the national and electoral votes edged up
between early October and the Carter-Reagan debate on October 28, the fact that time was
running out appears to have progressively reduced the perceived probability of a Carter
victory.
15. The activity surprise may have generated a downward revision in long-term U.S.
inflation expectations. (This hypothesis would be consistent with the Hoey data in table 2.2
if U.S. inflation expectations had been revised upward during September.) In addition,
expectations of the long-run real value of the dollar might conceivably have been revised
upward during November in response to the activity announcements, consistent with the
behavioral model suggested by condition (16).48 Peter Isard
notion of an appropriate long-run money growth path); accordingly, the
prospect of reduced deficits may lower inflation expectations. A second
view is that lower U.S. budget deficits are likely to imply a slower growth
of the supply of dollar-denominated public debt relative to the supply of
public debt denominated in other currencies. Accordingly, the risk pre-
mium on the dollar should decline, as was discussed in section 2.7. Given
both the expected long-run level of the exchange rate and the interest
differential, a lower risk premium on the dollar implies that markets clear
at a lower expected rate of appreciation of the dollar, and hence implies
higher spot forward values of the dollar.
The five-year forward dollar appreciated by nearly 25 percent against
the mark between mid-January and mid-June of 1981, and by another 5
percent through mid-August. Under the assumptions that the real ex-
change rate was expected to converge to its equilibrium level within five
years and that expectations were rational, how much of the appreciation
can plausibly be associated with revisions in each of the three expecta-
tional terms in the accounting framework?
It seems difficult to argue that the expected long-run real exchange rate
was revised substantially in a direction that strengthened the dollar
during this period. The monthly and quarterly data on U.S. and German
trade and current account flows fluctuated erratically but did not appear
to reveal any persistent surprises. Perhaps the Reagan program was
perceived to have supply-side effects that would allow U.S. businesses to
compete more successfully in world markets at any given level of the real
exchange rate, but it is difficult to associate more than a 5 percent
appreciation of the dollar with such an explanation.
A much larger part of the dollar's appreciation can be associated with
revisions in expectations about the long-term inflation differential. As
was shown in table 2.2, the Hoey survey suggests that the expected
five-year U.S. inflation rate per annum declined by 1.6 percentage points
between early October 1980 and early September 1981; the Michigan
Survey of Consumer Attitudes suggests a 1.5 percentage point decline
between August 1980 and August 1981. Such revisions can "explain" an
appreciation of 1
1A to 8 percent in the five-year forward rate. Forecasts of
German inflation over a one- or two-year horizon were revised upward
over the same period by 1 or 2 percentage points per annum, although the
increase in German inflation seems generally to have been viewed as
transitory. Thus, revisions in long-term German inflation expectations
may also have "explained" as much as a IV2 percentage appreciation of
the five-year forward dollar, but not much more.
The accounting arithmetic associates the remaining 10 percent appre-
ciation of the dollar with revisions in the expected five-year premium for
bearing exchange risk. Is this plausible? To the extent that investors are
not rational optimizers, a 10 percentage point change in the risk premium
would have no meaning beyond that of a residual in the accounting49 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
framework, and the question of plausibility would not be meaningful. To
the extent that investors do optimize, section 2.7 has argued that a 2
percentage point change in the risk premium is plausible, based on an
oversimplified representation of the portfolio optimization problem. It is
an open question whether a better analytic framework and a reassess-
ment of parameter values could establish the plausibility of a 10 percent-
age point change in the risk premium.
The point that seems most clear about the behavior of the mark/dollar
rate during 1981, as has been illustrated in figure 2.3, is that shifts in the
fiscal policy outlook were a major component of the news.
1
6 This has
important implications for how the news of 1981 must be quantified if
regression analysis is to be useful for telling the story and helping to
separate the effects that were channeled through inflation expectations
from the effects channeled through the risk premium. Some commonly
employed methods for capturing revisions in expectations are inadequate
for the 1981 experience. In particular, long-term inflation expectations
cannot be adequately represented by long-term nominal interest rates;
long-term dollar interest rates rose by 1 percentage point from late
January to mid-February and by another percentage point from late April
to mid-May, while the fiscal policy news presumably led to downward
revisions in U.S. long-term inflation expectations. Moreover, the fiscal
policy news was not accompanied by contemporaneous jumps in price
levels, activity variables, monetary aggregates, or budget deficits, so that
structural or autoregressive models of expectations based on current and
historically observed data are inadequate. Thus, to adequately capture
the revisions in long-term inflation expectations would seem to require
either a time series of direct survey evidence on inflation expectations or
at least a crude time series of future budget expectations or projections.
And a crude time series on the budget outlook also seems to be required if
regression analysis is to have any hope of adequately capturing revisions
in the risk premium.
2.10 Summary
The evidence is clear that empirical exchange rate models of the
seventies provide poor explanations of exchange rate behavior out of
16. When the unexpected components of week-to-week changes in monetary aggregates
are integrated over 1981, it is not clear that the net changes provided any significant news.
Alternatively stated, the below target growth of adjusted Ml-B and the above target growth
of M2 can be viewed to suggest that monetary policy, on balance, was neither easier nor
tighter than expected over the period as a whole. This is not to suggest that monetary policy
had no influence on exchange rates. The dollar would have been weaker had the Federal
Reserve pursued higher monetary growth targets; and dollar exchange rates did in fact
fluctuate week to week in response to surprises about the weekly money supply numbers.
The suggestion that, on balance, there was no surprise about U.S. monetary growth,
moreover, does not imply that there was no surprise about the path of dollar interest rates.50 Peter Isard
sample (see Meese and Rogoff 1983 and in this volume). Such evidence is
not surprising in view of the limited attempts that have been made to
model the news, given the strong presumption that exchange rate move-
ments are predominantly unexpected or, equivalently, are predomi-
nantly a reflection of revisions in expectations in response to news (see
Mussa 1979).
The first part of this paper has developed a framework of approximate
accounting identities that describe observable spot and forward exchange
rates in terms of three expectational terms: an expected long-run real
exchange rate, an expected long-term inflation differential, and an ex-
pected premium for bearing exchange risk. Under the commonly
adopted assumptions of time invariant expectations of the long-run real
exchange rate (PPP level) and the risk premium, it is evident from the
accounting framework that the substantial historical short-run variability
of observed spot exchange rates can only be explained by the hypothesis
that expectations about long-term inflation differentials have varied sub-
stantially relative to observed long-term nominal interest differentials.
This point raises the question of how long real interest differentials are
expected to persist, and some limited evidence has been presented sug-
gesting that the answer is longer than two years but perhaps no longer
than five years. An implication is that during periods in which the term
structure of nominal interest differentials changes shape, exchange rate
movements may be highly correlated with changes in long-term interest
differentials but not as highly correlated with changes in short-term
interest differentials, other things equal, which challenges the tradition of
modeling exchange rates in terms of short-term interest differentials.
In principle, all three of the expectational terms in the accounting
framework should be treated as variables—or as transmission channels
for the news—and the second part of the paper has discussed some issues
in modeling expectations of the long-run real exchange rate, the long-
term inflation differential, and the long-term risk premium. The third
part of the paper has discussed the major observed swings in mark /dollar
exchange rates (spot and five-year forward) during 1980-81, using the
accounting framework to draw inferences and conjectures on the extent
to which revisions in each of the three expectational terms "explained"
the exchange rate movements. The following summarized points have
been argued:
It is difficult to model the long-run real exchange rate without some
notion of a constraint on the long-run balance of payments; but given an
hypothesis about the specific nature of the long-run balance of payments
constraint, it is straightforward conceptually to model how expectations
of the long-run real exchange rate (or PPP level) are revised rationally in
response to news that revises expectations about whatever variables or
parameter values enter the long-run balance of payments constraint.
Quantitative discussions of exchange rate volatility can benefit from51 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
focusing on the length of the horizon over which real interest differentials
are expected to persist, or on the related question of how long it is
expected to take the real exchange rate to converge to its long-run level.
If it is expected to take T years for the real exchange rate to converge to its
long-run level, then the percentage change in the spot exchange rate that
should be associated with a shift in the term structure of nominal interest
differentials, other things equal, is roughly T times the percentage point
per annum change in the T-year interest differential.
During 1981, major swings in the exchange value of the dollar coin-
cided strikingly with major shifts in the outlook for U.S. budget deficits.
The fiscal policy news may have been transmitted to the long-term
forward rate through both revisions in long-term U.S. inflation expecta-
tions and changes in the expected premium for bearing exchange risk.
Long-term nominal dollar interest rates did not move in the same direc-
tion as long-term U.S. inflation expectations in response to the fiscal
policy news, nor was the fiscal policy news accompanied by contempora-
neous jumps in prices, activity levels, money supplies, or budget deficits.
Accordingly, the influence of fiscal policy news on inflation expectations
cannot be captured adequately without either survey measures of long-
term inflation expectations or models linking inflation expectations to
measures of expected future budget deficits (and/or money supplies) that
are not generated from autoregressions.
Available survey data on long-term U.S. inflation expectations suggest
that a major part of the fiscal policy news during 1981 was transmitted to
the exchange rate through revisions in expected long-term inflation dif-
ferentials. There is also a reasonable presumption, however, that the
five-year risk premium "explained" changes of at least 2 percent in
mark/dollar exchange rates in response to swings of at least $100 billion in
the expected cumulative flow of U.S. budget deficits over a five-year
horizon. The sequence of budget news that arrived during 1981 may
provide enough short-run variability in asset stock variables to capture
the risk premium with a structural model, but existing structural models
must first be refashioned into a rational expectations framework that
looks forward at expected future asset stocks. Moreover, autoregressive
models are inadequate for capturing revisions in expectations about
future asset stocks in response to the fiscal policy news that arrived during
1981.
A final point is that news about prices, activity, the balance of pay-
ments, the stance of monetary policy, and most other classes of variables
that enter exchange rate models is transmitted through multiple indica-
tors drawn from each class of variable. Extracting news from pools of
indicators enables market participants to filter out noise and to obtain
more frequent observations, and econometric techniques that did like-
wise might prove more efficient.52 Peter Isard
Appendix The Accounting Framework as a
Basis for Forecasting
There is an analogy between explaining the observed behavior of ex-
change rates ex post and forecasting exchange rates ex ante in a context in
which changes in exchange rates are associated with revisions in expecta-
tions in response to news. The ex post problem is to test a structural
equation using either direct or proxy measures of expectations or be-
havioral models of how expectations respond to the news. The ex ante
problem requires predictions of how much expectations will be revised in
response to the news.
A forecasting methodology can be illustrated using the accounting
framework and focusing on the risk neutral case for simplification. It is
necessary to distinguish between "average market expectations" held at
time t, Et, and the forecaster's expectations or predictions at time t, Et. It
is also useful to define
(Al) EtAEt+l = EtEt+l-EtEt,
where the forecaster may or may not be able to observe E, at time t.
Condition (9) of the accounting framework, under the maintained
assumption of risk neutrality, implies
(A2) E,sr+1 = Et[(p
A -p
B)t+i + (r
B - r"),+ u+r
+ 5 real,+ 7-].
A similar condition can be written with Et replacing E,. Combining both
of these conditions with definition (Al) and the risk neutrality assump-
tion E,st +! = ft t +!, and also using EtEt+1st+1 — E,st +1, it can be shown that
(A3) Etst+, -fut+l = EtAEt+l[(p
A -p
B)t+l
where T exceeds the length of time that it is expected to take for the real
exchange rate to converge to its long-run equilibrium level. Condition
(A3) states that the time t forecast of the spot rate at horizon t + 1, if
constrained to be consistent with the accounting framework, will equal
the one-period market forward rate at time t adjusted for time t forecasts
of the extent to which "average market expectations" about "explana-
tory variables" will be revised between times t and t + 1. The relevant
explanatory variables are the relative price level at t + 1, the (T — 1)
period real interest differential at t + 1, and the long-run real exchange
rate.
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crude sampling and extrapolation of private inflation forecasts. Time t
forecasts for nominal interest differentials at t + 1 are implicit in the
observable market yield curves and, together with forecasts of the rela-
tive price level and long-term inflation differential, can be used to infer
Ets rea\t+T from condition (A2) and the observed one-period forward
rate, ^ t+1. The predictions of what market participants will expect next
period, the EtEt+\ terms, involve more extensive ad hoc assumptions.
When the forecaster is provided with a macroeconomic model, an arbi-
trary but appealing set of predictions is that market participants as of time
t+1 will have come to expect the outlook for inflation rates, interest
rates, and the long-run real exchange rate that the model is predicting at
time t.
The latter assumption is particularly appealing in a context in which the
model forecaster has more advanced information than other market
participants about prospective data releases or policy announcements,
but it loses appeal to the extent that it may be unrealistic to assume that
market participants base their expectations on the same model (or that
market participants will come to believe in the forecasting model before
the date to which the forecast applies). The forecasting exercise gets
much more complicated once the possibility of two different models is
admitted, and questions then arise about how rapidly the models should
be assumed to adjust toward each other (or some true model) in response
to forecast errors.
Such considerations make clear the difficulty of avoiding some strong
ad hoc assumptions in any exchange rate forecasting exercise. Neverthe-
less, a belief that the structure of an exchange rate equation is correct and
that market expectations of variables that "explain" exchange rates are
predictably wrong—or likely to change in a predictable direction—pro-
vides some hope that exchange rate forecasts can be more accurate
predictions than forward rates.
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Comment Sebastian Edwards
Peter Isard has provided us with an interesting paper. His analysis clearly
points out some of the most important shortcomings of the present
vintage of exchange rate models. I will confine my comments to some
aspects of the model, without elaborating on Isard's interpretation of the
recent movements of the dollar/mark rate.
Isard's model is based on two nonobservable variables. Both his
"anchor"—the expected long-run real exchange rate—and his "rope"—
the expected long-term interest rate differential—are nonobservables.
Undoubtedly, this introduces some difficulties in any efforts to try to
empirically test the model in its present form. At the same time, this
difficulty in testing the model possibly explains why the empirical analysis
presented in the paper is based, almost exclusively, on casual observa-
tion. However, I will argue that the model can be manipulated in a simple
way that would yield interesting, testable hypotheses.
Dating Isard's equation (9), and using Et{Xt+k) as the expected value
of X in period t + k, conditional on all information available at period t, it
is possible to write:
(9') s, = pAt - pBt + Et{rBt+j) - Et{rAt+j) + £,(sreal,+/) - £f(
riskr+7),
where the expectations refer to some future period t + j. Assuming risk
averse agents, Isard's equation (A2) can be written as:
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(A2') £_,.,, = E,_,-0tf) - Et_t{pf) + Et_t{r?) - Et_t{rf)
where jj_,-,yt is the forward rate determined in period t — i for delivery in
period t. By subtracting (A2') from (9') it is possible to obtain an
expression for the market forecasting error, or difference between the
forward rate determined int — i and the actual spot rate in t:
(A2") 5,-/,_,-= -£,_,(iisk,) + [/tf -Et_t(pt)] -[pf -
+ [Et(rBt+j) -Et-t(rBt)] - [Et(rAt) - Et-i(rAtj]
+ [£,_,-(risk,) - Et(nskt+j)].
Equation (A2") is very interesting, since it explicitly indicates that the
actual spot rate at t will differ from the forward rate set in t - i for delivery
in t, by the seven terms on the right-hand side. While the first term is the
usual risk premium, the rest of these terms explicitly reflect the role of
new information, or news, on the forecasting error (st — ft_j). The pres-
ence of this news may explain why, during the recent floating period,
forward exchange rates have been poor predictors of future spot rates
(see Frenkel and Mussa 1980).
Notice that (A2") suggests that news about a number of variables
affects exchange rate behavior. Furthermore, to the extent that pt,
Et(srQa\t+j), Et{rAt+j), Et(rBt+j), and Et(nskt+j) are jointly determined, equation (A2") indicates that there are multiple channels through which
particular news (increases in the price of oil, for example) is transmitted
to the exchange rate. This interpretation of the role of news contrasts
with recent empirical work that has concentrated on analyzing the effect
of news with respect to one variable on exchange rates.
There are at least three ways to empirically test (A2"): (1) We can
directly incorporate unexpected changes of exchange rate determinants
to the right-hand side of the traditional market efficiency equation. This
has been done by Frenkel (1981a), who used the residuals from a fore-
casting equation for nominal interest rate differentials as an additional
independent variable in market efficiency equations. Dornbusch (1980),
on the other hand, has included unexpected changes in the current
account and real output—computed as deviations from OECD fore-
casts—as a measure of news in his regression analysis. (2) Use nonlinear,
full-information methods, testing simultaneously for market efficiency
and rational expectations. This has recently been done by Hartley (this
volume) in the context of the simple monetary model. (3) Use seemingly
unrelated regressions (SURE) methods that recognize that the unex-
pected changes of exchange rate determinants that appear on the right-
hand side of (A2") correspond to the error terms in forecasting equations58 Peter Isard
for these determinants. The use of this method would be useful in testing
the adequacy of Isard's model in the context of an exchange rate market
efficiency analysis.
In table C2.1, I report the SURE results of estimating a variant of
(A2") which incorporates news about real interest rates, real income, and
money at home and abroad. In these equations the dependent variable is
the spot rate and the independent variable is the previous month forward
rate. Table C2.2, on the other hand, presents the ordinary least squares
(OLS) results for the same currencies. As may be noted, the use of SURE
improves the estimate. In particular, while the market efficiency hypoth-
esis is rejected for the lira/dollar rate when OLS is used, it is not rejected
at the conventional level when SURE is used. For the cases of the
pound/dollar and mark/dollar rates, the market efficiency hypothesis is
not rejected under either method. However, for the franc/dollar rate it is
rejected under both estimation procedures. Further empirical work in
this direction—explicitly incorporating the role of news from equation
(A2")—should prove useful in testing the adequacy of the model pro-
posed by Isard.
I now turn to the analysis of PPP in the context of the present model.
Isard's equation (9) provides an explicit, and presumably testable, ex-
pression for deviations from PPP. According to this equation, deviations
from PPP (s — pA + PB) would be equal to the real interest rate differen-
tial (rB
e - rA
e), plus the expected real exchange rate (sreal
e) and the risk
premium. It seems to me that this formulation provides an interesting
point of departure for future empirical analyses that try to explain the
"collapse" of PPP during the recent period with floating rates.
In section 2.6 Isard discusses the expected long-term PPP level. Equa-
tion (16) provides an expression for the steady-state level of the real
exchange rate or "anchor." This condition is derived from the following
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SREAL, in this expression is equal to the ratio of the price of imports in
domestic currency to the price of exports also in domestic currency.
SREAL, = ^2.
P
It follows, then, that the log of this expression will be equal to sreal in
Isard's equation (3) only if iV, = PBt and if Pxt = PAt. This means that
Isard's "anchor" (16) implicitly assumes that both countries fully special-
ize in production and consumption. This is, indeed, a highly restrictive
assumption. However, if it is assumed that in both countries Px and P%i is
the only one of many goods that enters the price level, Isard's equation
(16) can be modified as follows:
(a2 + b2-
where sreal is indeed the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate (i.e.,
5real = s + pB -pA), and log (PX/PA) and log {PBIPM) are long-run steady-state relative prices.
This expression has the desirable property that, in addition to relating
the long-run real exchange rate to variables like interest rates and real
income, it explicitly incorporates relative prices. This is particularly
important since, traditionally, deviations from PPP have been related to
changes in the relative prices of tradables to nontradables (Balassa 1964).
Recently, on the other hand, Frenkel (19816) has attributed the large
deviations from PPP between the dollar and the franc to changes in
relative prices in France. Equation (16') will tend to predict, for example,
that an increase in the expected relative price of nontradable goods at
home, other things equal, will lead to an appreciation of the real expected
long-term exchange rate.
Peter Isard's paper is a positive contribution to the understanding of
exchange rate behavior. His analysis points out some of the major limita-
tions of our recent models. However, the paper falls short of providing
further insights on how these shortcomings could be avoided. As I have
argued, the general framework proposed by Isard can be extended to test
in a more formal way the role of news in exchange rate behavior.
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Comment Jeffrey A. Frankel
So many of our theories depend crucially on some concept of a long-run
equilibrium that we are always approaching, but never able actually to
observe, because it is a moving target. I regard Peter Isard's paper as a
very worthwhile attempt to bring the expected equilibrium exchange rate
out of the mists of the future and into the more tangible and observable
present. He does this by using five-year interest rates to construct a
five-year forward rate. In the monetary theory of the exchange rate we do
not worry about risk premiums, so this five-year forward rate should
equal the five-year expected spot rate.
1 Even for versions like Dorn-
busch's (1976) overshooting model that allow large short-run deviations
from equilibrium because of sticky prices, five years should be long
enough for the spot rate to be expected to return most of the way back to
equilibrium. Thus we know what the equilibrium exchange rate is ex-
pected to be in five years. If we assume no changes in the long-run
equilibrium real exchange rate (long-run PPP), then we need only some
measure of what changes in price levels are expected over the next five
years to get a measure of the equilibrium today that we can actually reach
out and touch.
For the 1977-80 period, Isard gets his data on expected price changes
from OECD forecasts. Since the forecasts look only one year into the
future, he is forced to try the argument out by hoping that one year is long
enough to get back to equilibrium. He finds (table 2.1) that when this
measure of the equilibrium spot rate is compared to current price levels,
the "residual changes" are large, usually positive for Japan and the
European countries, contradicting the null hypothesis that in equilibrium
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1. The risk premium can be easily integrated into the monetary equation of exchange
rate determination (Hooper and Morton 1982; Frankel 1983).62 Peter Isard
the spot rate should match the relative price levels. He concludes, I think
correctly, that the problem is that one year is not a long enough horizon
for the forward rate to equal the expected equilibrium rate, and that it is
not necessary on this evidence to invoke changes in either (1) the long-
run real exchange rate or (2) the risk premium.
On the issue of the speed of convergence to equilibrium, a variety of
evidence exists. First, studies of PPP show a high serial correlation of
deviations; something like 37 percent of a deviation can be expected to
remain after one year (Genberg 1978). Second, the existence of a real
interest differential indicates that the exchange rate is currently deviating
from its equilibrium path and is expected to return toward it. The coef-
ficient of the real interest differential in an exchange rate regression is the
inverse 1/6 of the expected speed of return to equilibrium. A coefficient
like 1.5 for three-month interest rates implies that 48 percent of the
deviation is expected to remain after a year (.48 = [1 - 1/4 x 1.5]
4; see
Frankel 1981). So I think it is clear that one year is not long enough to get
back to equilibrium.
When he moves on to the 1980-81 period, Isard has additional in-
formation on changes in expected inflation, and thus feels freer to go
beyond the one-year horizon to the five-year horizon in computing his
future equilibrium exchange rate. It seems safe to assume that very little




The five-year forward rate computed in table 2.3 (last column) and
graphed in figure 2.2 for early 1980 fluctuates sharply. The question is:
Can the fluctuations be explained by changes in the expected five-year
inflation rate? If not, we would have to admit fluctuations in either (1) the
long-run real exchange rate or (2) the risk premium. I think Isard does an
excellent job of explaining the movements in the forward rate by the news
that was coming out at the time on U.S. inflation: unfavorable in Febru-
ary and then favorable from March on. There is no need to invoke option
(1) or (2). And when we look at the spot value of the dollar, we see a very
close correspondence with the real interest differential—both rising
throughout the winter, peaking sharply in April, and declining in
midyear—which fits the sticky-price monetary model very well.
Figure 2.3 shows the five-year forward rate for late 1980 and 1981.
Once again it can be explained by developments on the inflation front,
both the decline in June-September 1980, attributable to the ending of
the recession, and the subsequent large one-year rise, attributable to the
Federal Reserve renewing monetary restraint and to Reagan taking
office. Throughout 1981 the spot rate story has been almost identical to
the forward rate story, because European and U.S. interst rates have
moved pretty much in tandem.63 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
The positive correlation between the real interest differential and the
value of the dollar over the last two years is as clear if one uses short-term
interest rates as if one uses five-year interest rates. A major assertion of
the paper (section 2.3) is that long-term rates are more reliable indicators
than short-term rates. But an opposing argument can be made. To begin
with, assume that when the expected inflation rate rises, the rise becomes
increasingly reflected in the short-term interest rate with the passage of
time. For example, the stickiness of the price level prevents the real
money supply from falling in the short run, and thus the existence of the
money demand equation prevents the interest rate from rising in the
short run. Second, assume the expectations hypothesis on the term
structure of interest rates: the long-term interest rate is the average of the
current short-term rate and expected future short-term rates. It follows
from these two propositions that changes in the long-term rate lie in
between changes in the short-term rate, which reflect the tightness of the
real money supply and changes in the expected inflation rate.
2 In princi-
ple, the short-term/long-term interest rate differential, the long-term
interest rate/expected inflation differential, and the short-term interest
rate/expected inflation differential should all be monotonically related;
they should be equally acceptable indicators of how tight monetary policy
is or of how overvalued the currency currently is relative to its equilib-
rium value.
Isard would argue that the virtue of using the long-term interest rate
instead of the short-term rate is that it does not require imposing assump-
tions about the term structure that may not be true. While we can be
pretty sure—on the basis of perceptions of the Reagan Administration,
survey data (table 2.2), and actual inflation numbers—that the expected
U.S. inflation rate fell in 1981, the long-term interest rate actually rose
(while the short-term rate did not). The only possible conclusion seems to
be that the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates
does not hold. Investors are reluctant to buy long-term bonds, having
been burned so many times before on predictions that short-term rates
would fall. They now require a risk premium, which explains why long-
term rates have remained high even though expected inflation has de-
clined. Suggestions have been made that the increased risk premium on
long-term bonds can be modeled as an increase in risk aversion or in
perceived uncertainty, attributable to the experience of the last ten years,
or as an increase in the supply of government bonds to the market, arising
out of Reagan's budget deficits that are perceived (correctly) by Wall
Street to be growing rather than shrinking.
2. The argument that the long-term interest rate is a linear combination of the current
short-term rate and expected inflation is formalized in Frankel (1982).64 Peter Isard
Isard's history of the mark/dollar rate in 1981 concludes that, though a
1V2 percentage point decline in expected U.S. inflation and a similar rise
in expected German inflation may account for a 15 percent appreciation
of the dollar, the remainder of the 25 percent appreciation can perhaps
only be explained by the risk premium. This would require that the
relative risk premium paid on dollar bonds (i.e., the U.S.-German in-
terest differential less expected dollar depreciation) fell over the period,
so that the high real interest rates that held up the value of the dollar
represented even greater discipline on the part of U.S. authorities than
one would otherwise realize. He argues that the dollar risk premium had
reason to fall in early 1981, because when Reagan took office people
expected the government budget deficit to fall. He even has a calculation
(equation [17]) of the effect on the risk premium of a 10 percent reduction
in the expected stock of U.S. public debt over a five-year horizon.
While it is perfectly possible that the prominent media coverage given
to the novel claims of supply-side economics led the public in 1981 to
expect that reduced budget deficits would follow from Reagan's policies,
the obvious question is where this leaves the explanation of why long-
term interest rates rose rather than fell. And even if we take the high U.S.
interest rates as somehow given, as Isard does, so that the reduced U.S.
risk premium takes the form of lower expected dollar appreciation, how
can the expectation of a reduced supply of dollar debt in the future, as
opposed to an actual reduction in the present, raise the current value of
the dollar more than its expected future value? Indeed, given the negligi-
ble actual changes in nominal debt levels that can occur in a few months
and given the ex post 30 percent appreciation of the dollar, the share of
dollar debt in global private holdings of dollar plus mark debt must have
risen from 80 percent to 85 percent, not fallen, requiring by equation (17)
an increase in the dollar risk premium, not a fall. This would be consistent
with the high U.S. interest rates, but what started the process?
The problem lies not with Isard's accounting framework but with the
apparently inconsistent paths in 1981 of the four key U.S. variables: the
short-term interest rate, expected inflation, the exchange rate, and the
long-term interest rate. The evidence is inescapable that expected infla-
tion fell and that the high short-term interest rate represented an in-
creased real interest rate brought on by tight monetary policy. Surveys of
expectations and actual inflation numbers both show declines, and the
effects of a high real interest rate on the economy are evident: depressed
real activity (especially in interest-sensitive sectors), a sluggish stock
market, and a very strong dollar. But then how can one explain the rise in
the long-term rate? One can bring in risk. But the more one tries to argue
that the U.S. risk premium fell in 1981 (due to a fall in perceived risk or
government debt) to reconcile the gloomy outlook in long-term bond
markets with the rosy outlook in the foreign exchange market, the harder65 How Exchange Rates Respond to the News
it is to explain the rise in long-term interest rates relative to short-term
rates. And the more one tries to argue that the U.S. risk premium rose in
1981 (due to a rise in perceived risk or government debt) to explain the
upward tilt in the interest rate term structure, the harder it is to explain
the strength of the dollar. One is tempted to be satisfied with short-term
interest rates when trying to explain the exchange rate and to leave the
behavior of the long-term rate as a puzzle for economists studying the
term structure of interest rates.
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